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ABSTRACT
This study examines the effect of price on the demand for health insurance by early retirees between
the ages of 55 and 64. The analysis is based on administrative data from a medium sized employer
and takes advantage of a natural experiment created by the firm's health insurance contribution
policy. The amount the firm contributes toward retiree health insurance coverage depends on when
a person retired and her years of service at that date. As a result of this policy, there is considerable
variation  in  out-of-pocket  premiums  faced  by  individuals  in  the  data,  but  this  variation  is
independent  of  the  non-price  attributes  of  the  health  insurance  plans  offered,  and  plausibly
exogenous to individual characteristics that are likely to affect the demand for insurance. We find
that price has a statistically significant but small effect on the decision to take up coverage. The
implied elasticities are very similar to results found in previous studies using very different data.
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There is considerable concern among US policy makers about the insurance coverage of “near-
elderly” adults, i.e., those between the ages of 55 and 64. Because attachment to the labor
force weakens as individuals approach the normal retirement age of 65, individuals in this age
group have lower rates of employer-provided health insurance than younger adults (Monheit,
Vistnes and Eisenberg 2001). Many older workers who lose their jobs are unable to ﬁnd new
jobs that provide health insurance, while others withdraw from the labor market altogether.
Whereas many early retirees could once continue to receive insurance through their former
employer, in the past decade there has been a dramatic decline in the percentage of employers
oﬀering such coverage (McCormack et al. 2002; Weller, Wenger and Gould 2004). Many
ﬁrms that continue to provide retiree health beneﬁts have substantially increased the cost
to early retirees (US General Accounting Oﬃce 2001; Neuman 2004), and a growing number
of ﬁrms oﬀer “access only” plans, where the employer requires retirees to contribute the
full premium. These trends are likely to continue. Retiree health beneﬁts have also been
eliminated as part of several high proﬁle bankruptcy proceedings (for example, Polaroid,
Bethlehem Steel). According to a 2003 survey of private sector employers, 10% of ﬁrms
oﬀering retiree health beneﬁts have eliminated coverage for future retirees, and an additional
20% of ﬁrms are considering doing so (McArdle et al. 2004).
In light of these trends, recent policy proposals aimed at increasing insurance coverage
have directly targeted the near-elderly. In each of his last three State of the Union Addresses,
President Clinton proposed allowing the near-elderly to buy into Medicare at actuarially fair
prices (Short, Shea and Powell 2001a). In 2000 and 2004, Democratic Presidential candidates
Al Gore and John Kerry proposed a subsidized buy-in for 55 to 64 year olds. Congressional
Democrats have proposed similar policies. The preferred strategy among Republicans for
expanding health insurance relies on tax credits for non-group coverage. While this approach
is not speciﬁcally targeted at particular age groups, the impact of a tax credit policy is likely
to be most pronounced on the near-elderly as they tend to have a stronger demand for
insurance and are more likely to rely on the non-group market than younger consumers.
In order to better understand the implications of the decline in employer payments for2
retiree health insurance and to evaluate these policy proposals, it is necessary to have good
estimates of the price elasticity of health insurance demand for this segment of the popula-
tion. In this paper we use data from an employer-sponsored retiree health insurance program
to estimate the eﬀect of out-of-pocket premiums on the insurance take-up decisions of early
retirees between the ages of 55 and 64. Like many employers, this ﬁrm altered its retiree
health beneﬁts program in the mid-1990s in an attempt to control spending. This policy
change created an excellent natural experiment for estimating the eﬀect of price on early re-
tiree health insurance decisions. Under the current system, the amount the ﬁrm contributes
towards the insurance coverage of retirees depends on when a person retired and how many
years she had been with the company. Speciﬁcally, for individuals who retired after January
1993, the employer’s premium contribution depends on how long the person had been em-
ployed at the ﬁrm. Thus, two otherwise similar individuals who retired at diﬀerent points
in time–i.e., before or after January 1993– face very diﬀerent prices. Similarly, for post-1993
retirees, prices also diﬀer for two people who retired at the same time but with diﬀerent
years of service. This variation is ideal for identifying the eﬀect of price on the demand for
insurance since it is independent of any features of the plans oﬀered (i.e., beneﬁt generosity
or the perceived quality of aﬃliated providers) and individual characteristics that are likely
to be related to the demand for insurance.
We use these data to estimate probit regression models of the decision by early retirees
to take up health insurance coverage oﬀered by the ﬁrm. The regression results indicate a
small but statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of price on the take-up decision. The implied price
elasticities range from -0.10 to -0.16. Our results are robust to various model speciﬁcations
and sample deﬁnitions and are in the range of previous studies that use diﬀerent data and
estimation strategies. We use these regression results to simulate the eﬀect of policy proposals
for a Medicare buy-in and a non-group tax credit on coverage rates. Because the estimates
imply that the take-up decision is fairly price inelastic, the simulations indicate small eﬀects
on take-up by near elderly retirees.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes several previous stud-
ies that also estimate take-up elasticities using data on workers oﬀered coverage by their
employers. Section 3 describes our data, presents descriptive evidence on the relationship3
between price and the take-up decision, and lays out our econometric strategy. We present
our regression results in Section 4. Based on these regressions, results from simulations are
reported in Section 5. The ﬁnal section discusses limitations of the analysis and identiﬁes
possible directions for future research.
2 Previous Literature
The estimation of premium elasticities requires good data on the insurance options available
to individuals and the prices charged for them. Population surveys that are commonly used
to study insurance coverage lack this information. Thus, most research on the elasticity
of demand for health insurance uses data on employees who are oﬀered insurance by their
employer but are required to contribute toward that coverage. The strengths and weaknesses
of these studies reﬂect the advantages and limitations of each data source.
Chernew, Frick and McLaughlin (1997) use data from a survey of small employers in
seven cities to model employee take-up as a function of out-of-pocket premiums. Focusing
on single, lower income workers, they ﬁnd a small but statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of price.
Their results imply take-up elasticities ranging from -0.03 to -0.095. Blumberg, Nichols and
Banthin (2001) take a similar approach, using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS). While the MEPS is a nationally representative survey, in order to use infor-
mation on the out-of-pocket premiums faced by employees, Blumberg, Nichols and Banthin
use a special sub-sample of the data. For workers with dependents, their estimated take-up
elasticities range from -0.03 to -0.08, depending on the econometric speciﬁcation. Estimated
price eﬀects for single workers are smaller.
The main limitation of both of these studies is that the variation in price comes entirely
from diﬀerences across employers. As a result, the results may be biased by unobserved
heterogeneity. The direction of this bias is unclear. On one hand, for ﬁrms that set employee
contributions as a ﬁxed dollar amount or a ﬁxed percentage of total premiums, plans that
have a higher actuarial value (and are therefore more attractive) will be more expensive to
employees. This will cause the price eﬀect to be biased toward zero. On the other hand,
if ﬁrms that pay higher compensation in general oﬀer better health beneﬁts and subsidize4
them more fully than ﬁrms that pay less overall, out-of-pocket premiums will be negatively
correlated with plan quality, causing the partial eﬀect of price to be overstated.
Two other studies each use data from a single employer. Gruber and Washington (2005)
analyze a natural experiment caused by a change in the tax treatment of employee premium
contributions that aﬀected some federal workers and not others. Using group-level data,
they exploit cross-sectional and intertemporal variation in the after-tax cost of insurance
generated by this policy change and changes in marginal tax rates. They estimate a take-up
elasticity of -0.02. Royalty and Hagens (2005) analyze a real experiment conducted by a large
employer as part of an eﬀort to redesign its fringe beneﬁt oﬀerings. Participating employees
were asked to choose from a menu of hypothetical beneﬁts, including health, dental and long
term care insurance as well as vision and wellness beneﬁts. For each type of beneﬁt there
were several alternatives including the option of declining coverage. The prices of the various
options were manipulated in order to estimate the impact of price on employee choices. For
all beneﬁts, price is found to have a small negative impact on the decision to take up any
coverage, though for health insurance the eﬀect was not statistically signiﬁcant.
An important advantage of the studies by Gruber and Washington (2005) and Royalty
and Hagens (2005) is that they exploit within-plan variation in prices that is independent
of other attributes of the health insurance oﬀered by employers and plausibly exogenous to
characteristics of employees that aﬀect the demand for insurance. However, each study has
its own shortcomings. Since Gruber and Washington’s price variable is a function of the
employee’s marginal tax rate, which is not directly observed, they must impute marginal
tax rates from other sources. The accuracy of this imputation and its impact on the results
are not clear. The main limitation of Royalty and Hagens’ analysis is that it is based on
hypothetical, rather than actual, choices.
Our research design is similar to these two studies in that we use data from a single
employer, and our identiﬁcation strategy is based on within-plan variation in price that is
plausibly exogenous. As in the Gruber and Washington study, the variation is driven both
by rules that generate cross-sectional price diﬀerences across diﬀerent classes of individuals,
as well as from changes in prices over time. The main advantage of our data relative to
theirs is that the price variable is observed directly in the data and measured without error.5
The main advantage compared to the data used by Royalty and Hagens is that we analyze
actual, rather than hypothetical, choices. A ﬁnal feature that distinguishes our analysis
from all the others in this literature is our focus on near-elderly retirees who, as noted in the
introduction, are an important population from a policy perspective.
3 Data and Methods
3.1 Data Source and Sample Construction
The administrative data we use come from a medium-sized employer (roughly 2,700 employ-
ees) located in the Southwestern US and pertain to the health insurance choices made by
early retirees from 1998 to 2003. Since we are interested in estimating take-up elasticities
that are relevant to Medicare buy-in proposals, we focus on retirees between the ages of 55
and 64. In order to minimize the impact of unobserved heterogeneity, we limit the analysis
sample to people who retired after 1990. The main reason is that individuals who retired
in the 1980s and are still under the age of 65 by the late 1990s must have retired at a very
young age. In some cases, the reason may have been a serious health problem; others may
have taken early retirement only to start a second career elsewhere. In either case, there is
reason to think that they are quite diﬀerent than the average retiree in this age group.
Because we use multiple years of data, individuals can contribute between one and six
observation to the sample. Overall, we have a sample size of 1,760 observations on 510
individuals.
3.2 Health Insurance Options and Prices
The ﬁrm oﬀers four diﬀerent health insurance options: two Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions (HMOs), one Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), and a cash payment for declining
coverage. The employer contribution toward coverage is less than the full premium for the
least costly plan; retirees are required to pay the diﬀerence between the employer contri-
bution and the full premium for their chosen plan. For all plans, a higher contribution is
required for two-party and family coverage than for single coverage.6
The exact amount the employer contributes depends on whether an individual retired
before or after January 1, 1993. Pre-1993 retirees receive a more generous subsidy. In 1998,
they were charged just over $5 per month for single HMO coverage and $12 per month for
single coverage under the PPO. Out-of-pocket prices increased during the period analyzed,
especially for the PPO. By 2003, pre-1993 retirees were charged $53 per month for one HMO,
$57 for the other, and $206 for the PPO. Throughout the period, the payment for declining
coverage was constant at $75 per month for this group.
For individuals who retired after January 1 1993, out-of-pocket premiums depend on the
person’s years of service at the time of retirement. Those who had worked for the company
for at least 25 years face the same prices as pre-1993 retirees. Retiree contributions increase
by a ﬁxed percentage for each year of service less than 25.1 So, for example, in 2003, the
monthly out-of-pocket cost for the cheaper HMO was $53 for a post-1993 retiree with 25
years of service, $69 for a post-1993 retiree with 20 years of service, and $130 for someone
who retired with 10 years of service. For post-1993 retirees with less than 25 years of service
the payment for declining coverage increases by $3 for every year of service.
This price variation is the greatest strength of these data. Most of our observations are on
post-1993 retirees. There is little reason to think that someone who started working for the
company 20 years prior to when we observe him should have a weaker or stronger demand
for health insurance than, say, someone who had started with the company 25 years earlier.
It is, perhaps, less obvious that the price diﬀerences between individuals who retired just
before and after January 1993 are uncorrelated with the demand for insurance. In principle,
someone with a very strong demand for coverage may have retired just before that date to
lock into lower premiums. However, such strategic behavior is not a factor in these data
because the employer’s policy was determined retroactively. So, even if some employees
might have been inclined to retire earlier to take advantage of a more generous subsidy, this
was not possible. Indeed, an examination of the pattern of retirements over time suggests
that the company may have chosen the January 1993 cut-oﬀ because a large number of
workers retired in early 1993 (see Appendix Figure A-1).
1For individuals retiring after 1993 with less than 25 years of service, the out-of-pocket premium is deﬁned
by P = F - C(1 - 0.04(25-s)), where F is the full premium (the insurer price charged to the employer), C
is the employer contribution for pre-1993 retirees, and s is the individual’s years of service at retirement.7
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our data. The mean of the dependent variable
matches up closely with published sources and prior studies. For example, according to
Monheit, Vistnes and Eisenberg (2001), in 1996 82% of US workers between the ages of 55
and 64 who were oﬀered employer-sponsored health insurance took up that coverage. The
take-up rate in our data is slightly higher than this ﬁgure (86.7%), but is essentially identical
to the take-up rates in the studies by Gruber and Washington’s (86.8%) and Blumberg,
Nichols and Banthin (86.4%).2
Since the ﬁrm oﬀers a choice of health insurance options, retirees face a schedule of
prices, corresponding to the diﬀerent plans available and diﬀerent coverage tiers (i.e., single,
two-party or family coverage). Following Blumberg, Nichols and Banthin (2001), we use the
price for the least costly option available, which corresponds to a single coverage option for
all individuals. For most observations in our data, the lowest cost option is single coverage
through one of the HMOs. In the full sample, the mean for the lowest premium available
is $59.81 per month .3 However, this price does not represent the full cost of taking up
coverage, as it does not account for the fact that individuals who take coverage forego a cash
payment of up to $75 per month. Thus, the true cost of coverage is the lowest premium plus
this foregone payment. The mean for this variable, which we use in our preferred regression
speciﬁcation, is $130.57. As a sensitivity test, we also estimate models using the mean price
over all (single coverage) options available to an individual summed with the cost of not
waiving coverage. The full sample mean for this price variable is $148.26.
As is typically the case with administrative data, there is relatively little information on
individual characteristics. We observe each individual’s age, gender, and marital status.4
Surviving spouses of deceased former employees are entitled to health insurance coverage
through the ﬁrm. They represent 5% of our retiree sample. We do not have data on income.
As a proxy, we use ZIP code level data from the 2000 Population Census for the median
income of households headed by adults between the ages of 55 and 64. The sample mean
2In Royalty and Hagen’s experiment 93% of participants said that they would take up health insurance.
3All prices are expressed in 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.
4Unlike most studies using health plan enrollment data, we observe actual marital status, as opposed to
whether the individual chooses to cover a dependent spouse.8
for this variable is $43,056, which is slightly lower than the national average for this age
group ($47,203). Information on each person’s ZIP code is also used to identify people living
in rural areas. We use this as a control variable to account for the possibility that other
insurance options may be more limited in such areas. An important limitation of this type
of administrative data for analyzing health insurance demand is the lack of information on
health status. As a consequence, we cannot test for diﬀerences in price elasticity related to
health risk5 or address questions related to adverse selection.
Table 2 presents several key variables for three subsamples: (1) pre-1993 retirees, (2)
post-1993 retirees with 25 or more years of service, and (3) post-1993 retirees with less than
25 years. Comparisons among these groups give a sense of the price variation generated
by the ﬁrm’s contribution policy, provide an informal check on our identiﬁcation strategy,
and foreshadow our regression estimates of the eﬀect of price. The ﬁrst thing to note is
that the mean age of each group is essentially the same. This is important given that of
the demographic variables that we observe, age is most closely related to expected medical
expenditures, which in turn will aﬀect the demand for insurance.
There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences across the groups in years of services, which is to be
expected given the way the groups are deﬁned. The mean is 30 years for group 2 (post-1993
retirees with 25 or more years of service) and about 18 for the other two groups. As described
earlier, groups 1 and 2 face the same contribution rules and therefore the same prices. Thus,
a comparison of the take-up rate for these two groups provides a test for a key assumption
of our estimation strategy, which is that years of service at the time of retirement aﬀects
take-up only through its eﬀect on out-of-pocket premiums. If this assumption is valid, we
should see similar take-up rates for groups 1 and 2. Group 3 faces signiﬁcantly higher prices
than 1 and 2. If there is a negative eﬀect of price, we should see a lower take-up rate for this
cohort compared to the other two. The data in Table 2 are consistent with both of these
predictions.
5Two recent studies on health plan choice ﬁnd that individuals in poorer health have a less elastic demand
(Royalty and Solomon 1999; Strombom, Buchmueller and Feldstein 2002).9
3.4 Econometric Speciﬁcation
To fully account for the variation in price, and to control for other observed factors that
are likely to aﬀect the demand for insurance, we estimate a reduced form probit model in
which the propensity to take up coverage (T*) is a function of the price of coverage (P) and
a vector of individual characteristics (X):
T
∗
it = αPit + X
0
itβ + uit. (1)
The observed analog to T* is a binary variable, T, that equals one if a person takes up
coverage through the ﬁrm and equals zero otherwise.6
The variables in X include several demographic characteristics: age, gender, marital
status and whether the individual qualiﬁes for health beneﬁts as a surviving spouse of a
former employee. We interact gender and marital status to account for the possibility that
gender diﬀerences in take-up behavior may be diﬀerent for married and single individuals.
Since married and single individuals have very diﬀerent outside options for health insurance,
their demand for coverage may be diﬀerent. In particular, some married retirees will have the
option of being covered through their spouse’s employer or former employer, an option that
will generally not be available for single individuals.7 Therefore, in addition to estimating the
model on a pooled sample with marital status as an independent variable, we also estimate
models on separate married and single sub-samples.
Given the source of price variation in our data, it is important to control for when a
person retired. We do this with four dummy variables corresponding to the following periods:
1993-1995, 1996-1998, 1999-2001 and 2002-2003. Pre-1993 retirees are the omitted category.
Additional controls include the ZIP code level median income from the 2000 Census (as a
proxy for income), year dummies and indicator variables for individuals who no longer live
in the state where the company is located and for individuals living in rural areas.
6Since less than 2% of our sample switches their insurance status over the years we study, we present
estimates from pooled probit regressions. We are reassured by this approach since the results are the same
for models that that account for the panel structure of our data.
7It is worth noting that simple cross-tabulations do not suggest the importance of such diﬀerences in out-
side options. The take-up rates for married retirees (87.2%) and single retirees (87.8%) are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from each other.10
4 Regression Results
Table 3 present the probit results. The price variable is the out-of-pocket premiums for
the least costly plan available. The ﬁrst column is for the full sample; in the next two, the
sample is stratiﬁed by marital status. Since probit coeﬃcients are not directly meaningful, we
report marginal eﬀects (i.e., probability derivatives) evaluated at the mean of the particular
estimation sample. The standard errors for these eﬀects are in parentheses.8 For the price
coeﬃcient, we also report an estimate of the mean elasticity evaluated over the estimation
sample.
Before turning to the estimated price eﬀects, we will brieﬂy summarize the coeﬃcients on
the control variables. There is a strongly positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of age in
the full sample and the married sub-sample. The results imply that, all else equal, the take-
up rate for the oldest individuals in our sample (64 year olds) is 17.7 percentage points higher
than the take-up rate for the youngest individuals (55 year olds). This result is qualitatively
similar to Chernew, Frick and McLaughlin (1997) and Gruber and Washington (2005). We
also ﬁnd that married men are more likely to take up coverage than married women. The
diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant (p-value= 0.02). Among single workers, however, the
gender diﬀerence goes the other way. This pattern is consistent with previous research
on take-up (not controlling for price) using nationally representative data (Buchmueller
1996/1997) and with the results of Blumberg, Nichols and Banthin (2001). Individuals who
qualify for health beneﬁts because they are the surviving spouse of a former employee are
signiﬁcantly less likely to take up coverage, perhaps, because they have a weaker attachment
to the ﬁrm.
Controlling for other factors, take-up is higher for individuals living in a rural area and
lower for individuals who have moved out of state. The former eﬀect may reﬂect the dearth
of lower cost managed care insurance options in rural areas; the latter may be explained by
the fact that people who have left the state are no longer in the service area of the company’s
insurance plans. The coeﬃcient on our income proxy is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05
level in the full sample and at the 0.10 level in the married sub-sample. This result is also
8The calculation of the standard errors takes into account the fact that we have multiple observations on
most individuals.11
consistent with other studies that ﬁnd a positive income eﬀect on take-up (Chernew, Frick
and McLaughlin 1997; Blumberg, Nichols and Banthin 2001; Gruber and Washington 2005).
In the full sample and the married sample, the retirement year coeﬃcients do not follow
any systematic pattern; only one of the coeﬃcients is signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level, and none
are signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. In the single retiree sample, none of the year of retirement
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant. In fact, only one of the four has a t-statistic greater than one.
This pattern supports our identiﬁcation strategy since some of the price variation is coming
from diﬀerences in when individuals retired.
The results for all three estimation samples suggest that higher premiums reduce take-up.
In Table 3, the marginal eﬀect for the full sample is -0.0007, which implies that $10 increase
in price reduces take up by 0.7 percentage points. The estimated price eﬀect for the married
sub-sample is similar, which is not surprising given that over three-quarters of the sample
is married. Both of these point estimates are statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. Like
Blumberg, Nichols and Banthin, we ﬁnd a weaker price eﬀect for single individuals. For that
sub-sample, the marginal eﬀect of price is -0.0003 (p-value = 0.12). This diﬀerence between
married and single retirees may be explained by the fact that married workers are more
likely to have other insurance options, most importantly the option of obtaining coverage
through their spouse’s employer or former employer. Single individuals, in contrast, have
fewer substitutes and thus have a less elastic demand.
Evaluated at the sample means, these price eﬀects imply take-up elasticities ranging from
-0.10 for singles, -0.15 for married individuals, and -0.16 the full sample. These elasticities are
larger in magnitude than those estimated in prior studies. However, such comparisons must
be made with caution as the average prices in our data are higher than in those studies. For
example, in the data used by both Chernew, Frick and McLaughlin and Blumberg, Nichols
and Banthin, the mean employee contribution is about $20 per month.9 The mean price for
our full sample is $130.57 per month. When we calculate the elasticity for the full sample
at a price of $23, which is Blumberg, Nichols and Banthin’s mean expressed in 2003 dollars,
and leave all other variables at the sample mean, we obtain an estimate of -0.03, which is
9Comparisons with the other papers are less straightforward. The main independent variable in Gruber
and Washington’s study is the employee’s share of premiums. Royalty and Hagens do not provide enough
information to compare the mean prices in their data to ours.12
very similar to the elasticity estimates of those prior studies.
4.1 Sensitivity Tests
To test the robustness of these results, we estimated a set of models using alternative speciﬁ-
cations and sample deﬁnitions. First, we considered the impact of using an alternative price
variable. Instead of using the premium for the lowest cost plan, we use the average premium
facing an individual. (As before, we add to this premium the payment foregone by not waiv-
ing coverage.) The results based on this price variable are qualitatively similar to those from
our preferred speciﬁcation. For the full sample and the married sub-sample, the marginal
eﬀect of price is slightly higher when we use the mean price (-0.0012 vs. -0.0007), though the
conﬁdence intervals for the two estimates overlap considerably. For singles, marginal eﬀect
of price for the mean price model is essentially the same as when we use the minimum price
(-0.0004). These similarities are not surprising given that the contribution rules that are the
source of identifying variation shift the whole menu of prices. In addition, in the early years
of the data the premium diﬀerences across plans were small, so the least costly premium and
average premium are highly correlated.
Next, we altered the sample inclusion criteria to make the estimation samples more
homogeneous. One potential criticism of our main analysis is that part of price variation
comes from diﬀerences between individuals who retired before and after January 1993. While
we explicitly control for the main eﬀect of retirement cohort, it is possible that this does
not fully account for behavioral diﬀerences among these two groups. Therefore, we re-
estimated the models on a sample that excludes individuals who retired before 1993. In this
sample, the cross sectional variation in price comes mainly from diﬀerences in the number
of years of service.10 The results for this restricted sample are essentially identical to those
in Table 3. For example, when we pool married and single retirees, the marginal eﬀect of
price is -0.0008. Because average prices are slightly higher for the post-1993 sample, the
corresponding elasticity is slightly larger in magnitude (-0.19 vs. -0.16). The point estimates
for the single retirees are identical for the two samples.
10There is some additional variation caused by the fact that not all retirees live in the service area of the
lowest cost HMO.13
Finally, we tested to see whether the estimated price eﬀects were sensitive to the way
that other variables enter the model. Since the variation in premiums is related to the timing
of retirement decisions, we need to ensure that the premium coeﬃcient is not sensitive to
diﬀerent parameterizations of age and retirement year. Therefore, we estimated models using
diﬀerent retirement year groupings. We also tested models in which age enters quadratically
or is measured in discrete categories. The main results were robust to these changes.
5 Policy Simulations
The elasticities we estimate can be used to predict the response to the further reductions in
employer premium contributions that retirees are likely to face in coming years as well as the
impact of diﬀerent policy proposals for subsidizing coverage. While a full micro-simulation
of these policies is not possible with our data, by simulating the percent of retirees taking
up coverage at diﬀerent levels of out-of-pocket premiums, we can provide a sense of how the
eﬀect of diﬀerent policy proposals will depend on the degree to which coverage is subsidized.
To this end, in Table 4 we report several simulations based on our regression results.
We begin by estimating the percentage of near-elderly retirees taking up insurance when
the coverage is subsidized at diﬀerent levels. This simulation is most directly relevant to
the question of what would happen to coverage if employers reduced the amount they paid
on behalf of their retirees. Since the estimated actuarial cost of extending Medicare to
this population is similar to the premiums for the plans charged by this employer, these
simulations are relevant to Medicare buy-in proposals.11 For each hypothetical subsidy rate,
we report two take-up rates. The ﬁrst is based on our full sample regression results (Table
3, column 1). One potential criticism of these results is that these results are strongly
inﬂuenced by the behavior of married retirees, who make up over 80% of our sample. It is
likely that some of these married retirees who drop the coverage oﬀered by this employer
are covered through their spouse. As a result, the full sample elasticity will overstate the
eﬀect of subsidies on the number of people with any coverage. Therefore, we also report
11According to the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (1999), the premium for a Medicare buy-in policy would
be roughly $300 per month. This is slightly higher than the average full premium for plans in our data
($275).14
simulations where the parameter estimates from the single retiree subsample are applied to
all retirees. These results provide a conservative estimate of the responsiveness of coverage
to subsidies.
The ﬁrst row in panel A reports the average monthly cost to retirees and the take-up
rate that would result if this employer converted to an “access only” plan whereby it made
retiree coverage available but provided no ﬁnancial contribution. Under this scenario, the
least expensive plan option facing the average early retiree in our data would cost $275 per
month and between 72% and 80% of eligible retirees would choose to take up coverage.12
Assuming that the coverage oﬀered by this employer is roughly comparable to Medicare
coverage, the results in row 1 of panel A also pertain to a policy allowing 55 to 64 year olds
to purchase Medicare coverage at actuarially fair premiums. If the employer or the Federal
government were to pay a quarter of the full premium, we estimate that between 80% and
85% of individuals would enroll. A 50% subsidy (which is quite close to the mean subsidy
in these data) corresponds to a take-up rate of 87% to 89%, depending on whether we use
the coeﬃcient estimates from the full sample or the single subsample.
In the second panel of the table we simulate what would happen if the employer were
to drop retiree coverage altogether, leaving retirees to purchase coverage in the non-group
market. Because of higher administrative and marketing costs–i.e., “loading” fees–non-
group premiums will be even higher than the “access only premiums” in panel A. We adjust
premiums by assuming a loading fee of 5% for a group of this size and 30% for non-group
plans.13 Based on this adjustment, coverage comparable to what this employer oﬀers would
cost $339 per member per month. Because this amount is much higher than the sample
mean, there is a larger diﬀerence in the simulated take-up rates corresponding to the full
sample and single sample coeﬃcients. The full sample results predict that slightly less than
two-thirds of 55 to 64 year od retirees would choose to purchase non-group coverage. Using
the single retiree coeﬃcients yields a prediction of just over three-quarters.
In its 2006 Budget, the Bush Administration proposed a $1000 annual tax credit for
12An important caveat with this simulation is that this premium amount is outside the range of prices
observed in our data. Only 5% percent of the retirees in our sample face monthly out-of-pocket premiums
higher than $170.
13These estimates are based on typical loading rates reported in the literature. See, for example, Phelps
(1997) and Pauly, Percy and Herring (1999).15
the purchase of non-group coverage. Two bills by Congressional Republicans (H.R.765 and
S.160) propose subsidies of the same amount. The second row of panel B simulates the eﬀect
of such a policy. The $1,000 credit would reduce the cost of this type of coverage by roughly
25%. Based on the full sample results, this would in turn increase the percentage of near
elderly retirees with non-group coverage by 11.4 percentage points, or by 18% relative to the
simulated non-group coverage under the assumption of no subsidy. When we use the smaller
elasticity estimate from the single retiree sample, the change in the number of insured is
smaller–a gain of 6 percentage points.14
6 Discussion
Estimates of the price elasticity of health insurance take-up are necessary for predicting
how consumers will respond to policies that subsidize the purchase of health insurance and
for making comparisons among such policies that diﬀer in the extent of the subsidy. The
best evidence on take-up elasticities comes from studies that use data on employees who are
oﬀered health insurance by their employer and are required to make premium contributions
toward that coverage.
In this study, we estimate take-up elasticities using unique data from an employer-
sponsored retiree health beneﬁt program. Our research design takes advantage of a natural
experiment generated by the employer’s policy on contributing to retiree health insurance
coverage. There are advantages and disadvantages of this approach. The most important
advantage is that the employer’s contribution policy generates price variation that is uncor-
related with the quality of plan oﬀerings and are plausibly exogenous to individual char-
acteristics that inﬂuence the demand for health insurance coverage. Therefore, bias from
endogeneity or unobserved heterogeneity is much less of a concern than it is in studies where
the price variation comes from diﬀerences across employers. A limitation of using data from
14The simulations of the tax credit policy are subject to another important caveat. Our results assume
that everyone who seeks non-group coverage is able to buy it at essentially community rated premiums. This
is not generally the case under current regulations in most states (Simantov, Shoen and Bruegman 2001;
Shea, Short and Powell 2001). Therefore, in absence of other policy developments (e.g., non-group market
underwriting reforms, the expansion of subsidized high risk pools), consumers who are deemed to be “high
risk” may be unable to use the tax credit.16
a single ﬁrm is that the early retirees that we analyze may not be representative of the entire
near-elderly population. For example, employees with access to retiree health beneﬁts tend
to work for larger ﬁrms and have higher than average incomes (Weller, Wenger and Gould
2004; KFF/HRET 2003).15
One striking ﬁnding from this study is that despite diﬀerences in methodology and the
populations studied, our results are quite similar to the results of prior studies based on
survey data (Chernew, Frick and McLaughlin 1997; Blumberg, Banthin and Nichols 2001)
as well as those that use other types of natural experiments (Gruber and Washington 2005;
Royalty and Hagens 2005). Like those studies, we ﬁnd that the out-of-pocket price of in-
surance has a small, but statistically signiﬁcant impact on the decision by early retirees
to accept coverage oﬀered by the employer. The implied elasticities range from -0.10 to -
0.16, depending on the sample. These elasticity estimates imply that near-elderly consumers
would respond to policies that either subsidized non-group insurance or allowed access to
Medicare prior to age 65, but this response would be modest. Another limitation of our data
(and the data used in the prior studies) is that we do not observe whether individuals who
decline coverage through their own ﬁrm have alternative sources of coverage, such as through
a spouse’s employer or former employer. As a result, while we can simulate the number of
individuals who would take up coverage that is oﬀered to them at diﬀerent prices, we cannot
assess what fraction of newly enrolled individuals would have otherwise been insured and
what fraction would merely switch from one type of insurance to another.
A ﬁnal limitation of our study is that we are not able to investigate diﬀerences in consumer
behavior and coverage outcomes related to health risk. These diﬀerences have potentially
important implications for the cost of diﬀerent policy initiatives and their impact on coverage.
In particular, the eﬀectiveness of tax subsidies and other policies aimed at increasing non-
group health insurance coverage will depend on the prices and options available to high
risk consumers in the non-group market. These outcomes will, in turn, depend on market
rules pertaining to insurer underwriting practices. These questions represent an important
direction for future research.
15Although the ZIP code average income for our sample is quite close to the national average for this age
group, without individual-level data on income we cannot deﬁnitively rule this out as an important diﬀerence
between our sample and the population.17
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Dependent Variable    
Take-up of Coverage (0,1)  0.87  (0.33) 
 
Price Variables    
Minimum Premium ($/month)  59.81  (51.76) 
Minimum Premium + Amount Foregone by 
Not Waiving Coverage ($/month)  130.57    (45.56) 
Average Premium + Amount Foregone by 
Not Waiving Coverage ($/month)  148.26  (53.13) 
 
Other Covariates    
Age (years)  60.7  (2.87)  
Male (0,1)  0.75  (0.43) 
Married (0,1)  0.83  (0.38) 
Retired after January 1993 (0,1)  0.87  (0.33) 
ZIP Code Level Median Income ($000)  43.06  (12.26) 
Surviving Spouse of Former Employee (0,1)  0.05  (0.22) 
Lives in a Rural Area (0,1)  0.41  (0.49) 
Lives Out of State (0,1)  0.12  (0.32) 
 
Number of Observations    1760 
Number of Individuals    510 
Note: The minimum premium is the out-of-pocket price of the least expensive single coverage plan 
available. The average premium is the mean out-of-pocket price of single coverage plans available. Table 2. Differences in Selected Variables Among Retirement Cohorts 
 
 
Post-1993 Retirees By Years of Service 
 
Pre-1993 Retirees 
≥ 25 Years   < 25 Years 
Minimum Monthly Premium  37.65  41.04  82.40
ab
 (34.89)  (28.07)  (64.46)
 
      
Take-Up Rate  0.94  0.92  0.79
ab
 (0.24)  (0.26)  (0.40) 
      
Age 60.30  59.65  60.46 
 (2.86)  (2.77)  (2.92) 
      
Years of Service  18.10  30.08
a 18.69
b
 (9.61)  (3.50)  (3.78) 
 
Number of Observations 







a Significantly different from pre-1993 cohort. 
b Significantly different from post-1993/≥ 25 years of service cohort. Table 3.  Take-up Probit Regression Results  






Relative Minimum Premium  -0.0007**  -0.0007**  -0.0003 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
  [-0.158] [-0.146] [-0.101] 
Married -0.1280**     
 (0.0274)     
Male -0.1177  0.0597  -0.1764* 
  (0.0458) (0.0484) (0.0904) 
Married*Male 0.2872*     
 (0.1538)     
Surviving  Spouse  -0.5939**  -0.4108** 
 (0.1962)    (0.1478) 
Age 0.0177**  0.0204**  0.0070 
  (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0076) 
Ln(ZIP-Level Median Income)  0.0894*  0.0883  0.0814 
  (0.0451) (0.0484) (0.1183) 
Nonmetro Residence  0.0645*  0.0663*  0.0415 
  (0.0275) (0.0309) (0.0472) 
Out of State Residence  -0.0559  -0.0680  -0.1646 
  (0.0614) (0.0679) (0.1946) 
1993-1995 Retiree  -0.1107  -0.1909  0.0365 
  (0.0673) (0.1105) (0.0568) 
1996-1998  Retiree  -0.0175 -0.0494 -0.0209 
  (0.0620) (0.0970) (0.0953) 
1999-2001 Retiree  0.0120  -0.0253  0.0431 
  (0.0520) (0.0864) (0.0485) 
2002-2003  Retiree  0.0679 0.0562 0.0526 
  (0.0293) (0.0526) (0.0271) 
Year  1999  0.0038 0.0001 0.0090 
  (0.0125) (0.0152) (0.0119) 
Year 2000  -0.0033  -0.0110  0.0277 
  (0.0163) (0.0189) (0.0229) 
Year  2001  -0.0060 -0.0083 -0.0196 
  (0.0199) (0.0218) (0.0473) 
Year  2002  -0.0393 -0.0433 -0.0516 
  (0.0251) (0.0279) (0.0624) 
Year  2003  -0.0474 -0.0547 -0.0514 
  (0.0299) (0.0340) (0.0611) 
Number of Observations  1760  1458  302 
Number of Individuals  510  416  94 
Log Likelihood  -558.42  -462.71  -82.91 
Notes: ** = statistically significant at the 0.01 level; * = statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
The dependent variable equals 1 if the individual takes up coverage; zero otherwise. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The figures in brackets are the mean elasticities evaluated over 
the estimation sample. Pre-1993 retirees and the 1998 year indicator are omitted reference groups. 
 
   
Table 4. Simulation Results with Reduced Employer Sponsored Health Insurance Benefits 
  
 








1. Baseline- Employer Sponsored Insurance   $130.57  87.3%  88.7% 
      
2. Full Premium/Medicare Buy-In 
       No Subsidy  274.53 72.2 
 
80.4 
       25% Subsidy  205.90  80.5  84.9 
       50% Subsidy  137.26  87.1  88.7 
      
3. Non-Group Market 
       No Tax Credit  339.04  63.1 
 
75.6 
       $1000 Tax Credit  255.71  74.5  81.6 
Notes: The monthly premium is the average monthly minimum premium relative to the waive payment for the 
available health insurance options. The second column is based on the predicted percent of take-up of the full 
sample from column 1 in Table 3, and the third column is based on the predicted percent of take-up of the full 




































2001 2003  1999  1995 1997  1991 1993 
Date of Retirement